Evangelical Equality: The Feminism of Phyllis Schlafly by Erwin, Elizabeth Lauren
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Theses and Dissertations
2012
Evangelical Equality: The Feminism of Phyllis
Schlafly
Elizabeth Lauren Erwin
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erwin, Elizabeth Lauren, "Evangelical Equality: The Feminism of Phyllis Schlafly" (2012). Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1186.
 
Evangelical Equality: The Feminism of Phyllis Schlafly 
 
 
by 
 
 
Elizabeth L. Erwin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
 
Presented to the Graduate and Research Committee 
 
of Lehigh University 
 
in Candidacy for the Degree of 
 
 
Master of Arts  
 
 
 
 
 
in 
 
American Studies 
 
 
 
 
Lehigh University 
 
April 27, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 Copyright 
Elizabeth L. Erwin 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
Thesis is accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master 
of Arts in American Studies. 
 
 
 
Evangelical Equality: The Feminism of Phyllis Schlafly 
Elizabeth L. Erwin 
 
 
April 27, 2012 
                                                 
Date Approved 
 
                                                                     
        Dr. John Pettegrew 
                                                                          
     
                                                                    
       
 
 
 
                                                                      
        Dr. Edward Whitley 
 
 
    
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract        1 
 
Introduction       2 
 
Conceptual Theory      5 
 
Schlafly Pushed to the Margins     9 
 
Equal Rights Amendment & Schlafly    16 
 
Houston, 1977       26 
 
Conclusions       36 
 
 
Vita        42 
 1 
ABSTRACT 
 
The association of modern feminism to a decidedly liberal social platform 
excludes unfairly women who classify themselves as conservatives. New conservative 
feminism solves for this exclusion by situating motherhood in a position of power. This 
paper argues that Phyllis Schlafly’s speech in Houston on November 18, 1977 qualifies 
as a significant feminist moment in American History because it offers a feminist model 
of how women can be politically effective. While Schlafly would be the first person to 
dismiss such a label, her political trajectory suggests otherwise. By examining the roles 
marginalization and silencing have played in her career and how she has utilized these 
traditionally oppressive tools to her advantage, Schlafly’s unique contribution to 
feminism takes shape. 
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Introduction: 
When Phyllis Schlafly took the stage in Houston on November 18, 1977, she was 
heavily embroiled in a political fight that called into question the very legitimacy of her 
lived experience as an American female. Deemed a traitor by her opponents and ignored 
by mainstream media, Schlafly came to Houston a political exile of a women’s 
movement insistent upon silencing her. Her speech in Houston not only afforded her the 
opportunity to reclaim her voice publicly but it also provided the means by which to turn 
her marginalization into a position of power. 
 This paper argues that Phyllis Schlafly’s speech in Houston qualifies as a 
significant feminist moment in American History because it offers a feminist model of 
how women can be politically effective. While Schlafly would be the first person to 
dismiss such a label, her political trajectory suggests otherwise. By examining the roles 
marginalization and silencing have played in her career and how she has utilized these 
traditionally oppressive tools to her advantage, Schlafly’s unique contribution to 
feminism takes shape. 
 At the center of our argument is the idea that culture has two spheres: the 
dominant sphere and the marginalized sphere. The Dictionary of Sociology offers this 
definition: “A dominant culture is one that is able, through economic or political power, 
to impose its values, language, and ways of behaving on a subordinate culture or cultures. 
This may be achieved through legal or political suppression of other sets of values and 
patterns of behavior, or by monopolizing the media of communication.”1 Marginalization 
then refers to the space people or groups are relegated to as a result of suppression by the 
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dominant culture. While the feminism of this era was a rebuke of the dominant culture’s 
laws and social customs regarding equality between the sexes, the specific issue of the 
ERA was not as clear-cut.  
 When it was first proposed in 1919, the legislation had neither political nor social 
support in large degrees. Over time, however, the institutions of which the dominant 
culture was comprised-political, social and media- started to support the bill. By the time 
Schlafly entered the fray, the ERA was, according to Gallop polls, supported by the 
majority of Americans as well as politicians on both sides of the aisle.2 The media, too, 
gave its tacit support for the amendment via its positive coverage of the ratification 
efforts by proponents. In essence, the ERA enjoyed such wide-scale support that passage 
was considered to be inevitable. It was, after decades of arduous work, a reflection of the 
dominant culture's perspective. In relation to Schlafly, pro-ERA advocates classify as 
those in the dominant sphere because of their unequal access to media resources and 
Presidential support. Here we see too that who occupies which sphere, either the sphere 
of the dominant culture of that of the marginalized culture is fluid. 
It is argued that the second wave of feminism focused almost exclusively on the 
concerns of middle class, white women. This paper suggests one additional qualifier: 
liberal, middle class, white women. And just as feminism expanded to include the unique 
experiences of minority females so to must it expand to include the unique experiences of 
evangelical females. In order to have a true collective orientation of American feminism, 
the structural, cultural and historical conditions distinctive to female conservatives must 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 A Dictionary of Sociology, 2nd ed., s.v. “Dominant Culture,” 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-dominantculture.html (accessed April 5, 2012). 
2 National NOW Times, Now National Era Campaign Launched, Feb. 11, 1979. 
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be explored in order to understand the unique power relations contained within that 
identity. Positioning Schlafly’s experience in Houston within feminist theory allows us to 
examine the implications of Schlafly’s experience in broader terms than even Schlafly’s 
own ideology would allow. This is beneficial not only because it imbues the motherhood 
experience of women previously excluded from feminist research with gravitas but also 
because it challenges the sense of victimization inherent in most feminist research. 
As the undisputed figurehead of the anti-ERA movement in the 1970s, Schlafly 
was a lightening rod for feminists incensed by her rhetoric and frustrated by her political 
maneuvers. 
Equal parts hard lined debater and media strategist, Phyllis Schlafly ushered in a new era 
of political activism. By reinterpreting the legal inequities between the sexes as 
advantageous to females, Schlafly offered American women a new feminist narrative--
one that did not include inherent victimization at its core. In doing so, she “succeeded in 
doing something nobody had ever done. She had mobilized the conservative women of 
this country into a powerful political unit.”3 
 In many respects, Phyllis Schlafly is the embodiment of the feminist ideal. Not 
only did she manage to have a thriving career as a political activist while balancing her 
roles as wife and mother but she also refused to have her voice silenced by the dominant 
culture.  Raised in a family of educated, working women, Schlafly emulated their 
example by working her way through college as a weapons tester, earning a master’s 
degree from Harvard in Political Science, managing political campaigns, and running for 
                                                           
3 Lynn Rosellini, “Victory Is Bittersweet For Architect of Amendment's 
Downfall,” New York Times, July 1, 1982. 
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Congress herself. And yet, when asked to name her proudest accomplishment, Schlafly 
cites her role as mother to her six children. So, who is this woman and how did she 
manage to lead one of the most successful grassroots campaigns in American History?    
Conceptual Theory: 
 
 Drawing from feminist theory, sociology and communications theory, a 
conceptual theory that speaks to the stages of Schlafly’s feminist evolution develops and 
is appropriate to understanding Schlafly’s politics from an interdisciplinary perspective.  
While there exists no one universally agreed upon feminist theory, most researchers do 
acknowledge the critical role of power.4 For the purpose of this paper, power is conceived 
of as a resource “that can be possessed by individuals in greater or lesser amount.”5 Ann 
Cudd best explains this analytic feminist approach to power in her book Analyzing 
Oppression. She argues that four conditions must exist if power is to be thought of as 
oppressive6. First, individuals who belong to non-dominant culture social groups are at 
risk for unjust treatment.7 Second, these individuals are unjustly harmed because they are 
a member of the social group.8 Third, the harms suffered by the individuals are unjust and 
are a by-product of coercion.9 Fourth, the privilege condition must be present which 
means “coercive, group-based harms count as oppression only when there exists other 
                                                           
4 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses On Life and Law 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 123. 
 
5 Iris Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in Rethinking Power (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1992), 31-32. 
 
6 Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
25. 
 
7 Ibid., p. 23. 
8 Ibid., p. 22. 
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social groups who derive a reciprocal privilege or benefit from that unjust harm.”10  This 
definition is appropriate to our examination because it analyzes power within the context 
of dominant and marginalized cultures. It is these power relationships derived from 
privilege that provide the basis for our inquiry. 
 Social science researcher Robyn Fivush best articulates the relationship between 
power, privilege and voice: 
Views from more culturally accepted standpoints are considered the center, 
whereas views from less accepted standpoints are at the margins.  The view from 
the center is given “voice.”  It is the accepted version of our shared socially 
constructed reality, whereas views from the margins are “silenced.”  These stories 
are either not heard or these perspectives are not validated.  In this sense, power 
gives voice.11 
 
Consequently, if power is able to give voice, then it stands to reason that it too can take it 
away. 
 Researchers Dendrinos and Pedro argue “speech and silence can be used as tools 
of domination only by those who are empowered to use them.”12 In other words, the 
ability to silence is something available to the dominant culture but not necessarily 
marginalized groups. Silencing techniques include the ways the dominant culture 
suppresses the female voice. Examples of silencing strategies include ridicule, controlling 
the conversation taking place in the media, and censorship of ideas. These silencing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 Ibid., p. 22-23. 
10 Ibid., p. 23. 
 
11 Robyn Fivush, “The Feminist Model of Autobiography,” in The Mediated Mind: 
Essays in Honor of Katherine Nelson (Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2002), 6-7. 
 
12  Check entry 
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techniques then lead to “the denial of equal social and political rights, and of access to 
most positions of public influence.”13 
 Most of the existing feminist research explores silencing in the context of female 
oppression by males.14 This paper argues for a different approach to feminist power 
relationships based upon the silencing strategies advanced by Marsha Houston and Cheris 
Kramarae. They argue that the employment of silencing strategies is often done so that 
the marginalized group’s voice is perceived as “lacking universality.”15 It is not only a 
denial of that woman’s experience but it is also a means of controlling the public 
narrative. Houston and Kramarae contend that “women who write or talk publicly about 
their lives are courageous since these accounts often counter men’s records of women’s 
lives; the accounts and their tellers are considered troublesome and subversive.”16 Our 
research takes this idea one step further to illustrate that these female truth tellers are not 
only countering men’s records of the female experience but also records created by 
females within the dominant culture. 
 Dendrinos and Pedro note that in conversations with females, men typically are 
the ones in control. But what happens when that conversation is exclusive to females and 
still contains the power dynamics inherent in feminist research? Is it possible then to 
apply feminist theory to a movement that is by its own definition anti-feminist? Current 
                                                           
13 Ibid., p. 210. 
 
14 Iris Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in Rethinking Power (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1992), 183-193. 
 
15 Marsha Houston and Cheris Kramarae, “Speaking from Silence: Methods of 
Silencing and Resistance,” Discourse Society 2 (1991): 390. 
 
16 Ibid., p. 393. 
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research suggests the answer is yes. As posited by Judith Stacey, new conservative 
feminism offers a conceptual framework by which to examine the uniqueness of the 
conservative female experience. This theory provides a nod to the themes of nineteenth 
century domestic feminism that advocated for “a division of labor between women and 
men” but also “represents a struggle over what feminism will mean in the next political 
period.”17 
 Judith Stacey’s new conservative feminism “is a repudiation of sexual politics, the 
distinctively radical core of the women's liberation movement of the 1960s and 
1970s.”18 There are three core tenets of new conservative feminism. First, it adopts a 
“pro-family” stance in which sexual politics are viewed as a threat to the family.19 In 
other words, the politicization of the interpersonal relationships between males and 
females is viewed as detrimental to the stability of the family because it automatically 
situates males in the position of the aggressor. Second, new conservative feminism 
affirms traditional female roles, most specifically that of the mother.20 Rather than linking 
domesticity with subservience, it advocates that motherhood is actually a position of 
power. Third, new conservative feminism does not view the struggle against male 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
17 Judith Stacey, “New Conservative Feminism,” Feminist Studies 9, no. 3 (1983): 
579. 
 
18 Ibid., 561. 
 
19 Ibid., 561. 
 
20 Ibid., 563. 
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oppression as being a legitimate battle.21 Instead, it is an issue dismissed as a simple 
distraction from larger issues.   
 By itself, new conservative feminism does not offer a model appropriate to our 
inquiry. Yet, what it does offer is a new lens by which to consider the act of silencing. By 
recasting who occupies the role of the oppressor, new feminist theory allows us to 
consider silence in a less gender identified way. It is no longer assumed that maleness 
equates to power over femaleness. Rather, power is situated in the dominant culture and 
males don’t necessarily always occupy that base. 
Schlafly Pushed to the Margins 
 
 To understand how Phyllis Schlafly’s convention in Houston qualifies as a 
feminist moment, it is first necessary to understand her experience with marginalization. 
This is important not only because it provides context to Schlafly’s politics but also 
because it also illustrates how Schlafly saw her marginalization in terms of ideas and not 
sex. By considering how the Republican Party marginalized Schlafly, it is clear that 
Schlafly learned valuable skills about working from the margins that she would later 
employ in her battle against the ERA.  
 When Schlafly wrote A Choice, Not an Echo in 1966, she created a rift among the 
members of the Republican Party that has yet to truly heal.22 Up until the publication of 
the book, Schlafly had occupied a position of privilege within the party. Not only had she 
served as a delegate to the Republican National Convention in 1956 and 1960, but she 
                                                           
21 Ibid., 562-563. 
 
22 Carol Felsenthal, Phyllis Schlafly: the Sweetheart of the Silent Majority (Garden 
City: Regnery Gateway, 1982), 163. 
 
 10 
was also viewed as a defense expert whose expertise was routinely requested by sitting 
Presidents. Yet, it was her position as the unanimously elected vice president of the 
National Federation of Republican Women (NFRW) that was Schlafly’s position of 
greatest visibility. 
 Intended to be a warning to delegates on how the “kingmakers” of the party were 
selecting only candidates they could control, A Choice, Not an Echo is largely cited as 
being a pivotal turning point in Schlafly’s role within the party. According to Schlafly, 
the “kingmakers” were a group of men of significant power who were robbing the 
“grassroots” of their choice by establishing figurehead candidates they could 
manipulate.23 The rhetoric contained in Schlafly’s book incited many of the elite of the 
Republican Party who were particularly appalled that such sentiments would come from 
women within their own party. For her efforts, Schlafly was publicly tagged with the 
label of troublemaker. 
 As Republican state committees scrambled to suppress the book, support within 
the Party markedly switched from moderate Nelson Rockefeller to ultra-conservative 
Barry Goldwater.24 Many established members of the Republican Party attributed this 
change to Schlafly’s book and so, when Goldwater went on to secure the Republican 
presidential nomination and then suffer a crushing defeat, Schlafly became an easy 
scapegoat. Party officials quickly pinned the defeat on Schlafly arguing that it was her 
manipulations that lead to the selection of an ultra-conservative. 
                                                           
23 Justin Raimundo, Colin Powell and the Power Elite (New York: America First 
Books, 1996), page 6-8. 
 
24 Meg Greenfield, “The Goldwater Precedent,” Newsweek, August 1994, 64.  
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 In shades of what was to come in Houston, Schlafly found herself marginalized 
for her views. By deeming Schlafly’s politics as outside of the center, officials in the 
Republican Party, comprised overwhelmingly of affluent, white men, effectively moved 
Schlafly to the margins of the party. Yet, their core reason for doing so was based on 
Schlafly’s ideas on the future of conservatism and not her sex. At the time, there was a 
movement afoot in the Republican Party to silence any voice construed as disruptive to 
the overall agenda of the party.25 The arguments made by Schlafly in A Choice, Not an 
Echo certainly fit that bill. For her part, Schlafly dealt with this surprising turn by 
becoming uncharacteristically quiet in the face of an avalanche of criticism. Yet, even 
that was not enough for the kingmakers who were about to silence Schlafly by removing 
her from her most public platform. 
 In Houston, it would be female feminist organizations with the support of the 
male dominated Congress and Presidency who would actively work to silence Schlafly. 
Within the Republican Party, however, it was the female core constituency of the 
National Federation of Republican Women (NFRW), a 500,000 auxiliary association. By 
all rights, Phyllis Schlafly had been next in line for the presidency of the NFRW. 
However, the kingmakers, still smarting over the Goldwater defeat, publicly deemed her 
too conservative and threw their support behind Souther Californian Gladys O’Donnell. 
For the women in the organization who wanted Schlafly out, this move by the 
kingmakers provided a base of power from which they could work.  
                                                           
25 David S. Broder, “Who Controls the Republican Party,” Spokesman Review, 
May 11, 1967. 
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 The 1967 election for the presidency of the NFRW was fraught with contention 
and pitted two ideologies against one another. On one side were the women who 
occupied largely official positions within the Republican Party including the Federation 
board and state officials.  This contingent, led subversively by outgoing President 
Dorothy Elston Kabis who used her position to limit Schlafly’s access to NFRW 
resources, believed that moderate Republican views were the way to win national 
elections.26 Their concern was that the rhetoric espoused by Schlafly would divide the 
party and leave them vulnerable in the upcoming national elections. Gladys O’Donnell, 
their candidate of choice, was a politically active moderate whose grandmother like 
appearance and quiet demeanor made her the physical and rhetorical opposite of Schlafly. 
 Conversely, Schlafly’s supporters, made up primarily of the rank and file, felt that 
power was running amuck within the party and that the calculated efforts being taken 
against Schlafly was an effort to purge the party of ultra-conservatives. They pointed to a 
number of decisions made by the party’s establishment, including changing the election 
year in a private vote and the establishment of a seven person nominating committee, to 
support their claim that a “coup d’état” was in full effect. 
 Unlike with the male Republican establishment who had caught her off guard 
after the Goldwater defeat, this time Schlafly was prepared for the battle.  Most 
importantly, she began to appreciate the political benefits of being positioned in the 
margins. She “cast the election in moral terms--principle versus self-aggrandizement; 
democratic expression against rule by insider clique; the rank and file against the 
                                                           
26 Catherine E. Rymph, Republican Women: Feminism and Conservatism from 
Suffrage through the Rise of the New Right (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006), 294. 
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kingmakers.”27  This rhetoric that was only possible because those in power had cast her 
from the mainstream. 
 Critics of Schlafly have continually attempted to silence her from their positions 
of power. For example, GOP Chairman, Ray Bliss, attempted to prevent Schlafly from 
gaining a delegate list even though it was the right of every candidate.28 In doing so, it 
was hoped that Schlafly would be cut off from the rank and file who supported her. 
Similarly, a letter written by Goldwater designed to showcase his neutrality in the 
election was heavily edited by still President Dorothy Elston to seemingly illustrate 
Goldwater’s support for Schlafly’s rival, Gladys O’Donnell.29 It was only after 
Goldwater himself sent the unedited letter to Schlafly that his true position became 
apparent.  
 Most interestingly, however, was the charge levied against Schlafly that she was 
not a good mother. Labeled by her opponent as a “brainy snob who ought to stay home 
with her husband and six children,”30 it was an ironic charge to be levied at a woman 
whose name would become synonymous with support for the role of the homemaker.31  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
27 Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: a Woman's 
Crusade (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 149. 
 
28 Ibid., 154. 
 
29 Carol Felsenthal, Phyllis Schlafly; the Sweetheart of the Silent Majority (Garden 
City: Regnery Gateway, 1982), 121. 
 
30 Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: a Woman's 
Crusade (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 186. 
 
31 Sara Fitzgerald, Elly Peterson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press/Regional, 2011), 232. 
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Critics in the NFRW argued that Schlafly's responsibilities as a mother prevented her 
from putting for the energy required of an NFRW president. To make their point, these 
same critics engaged in a media campaign designed to portray Schlafly's aspirations as 
neglectful to the welfare of her children.32  
 All of this came to a head when the election for a new president of the National 
Federation of Republican Women was called to order. In a move that is eerily similar 
with what transpired in Houston, the “NFRW leadership excluded conservatives from the 
platform and filled the program with so-called ‘unity speeches from nearly every 
moderate-liberal Republican available.”33 And, as would happen in Houston, Schlafly 
was not allowed to address the convention.  
 Ultimately, Schlafly lost the election but her experience in dealing with the 
dominant culture of the Republican Party taught her that there was value in operating 
from the margins. To Schlafly, who never used her sex as an excuse as to why her voice 
was being belittled within the party, it was her staunch conservative views that set her 
apart from other Republicans. According to biographer Carol Felsenthal, Schlafly had 
“never been part of the Republican Ivy League establishment, perhaps because she is a 
woman, but perhaps also because her anti-communist views have always been too 
unfashionably strident, her isolationist tendencies too strident.”34 So when she was 
                                                           
32 Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: a Woman's 
Crusade (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2005), page 148. 
 
33  Ibid., 158. 
 
34 Carol Felsenthal, Phyllis Schlafly: the Sweetheart of the Silent Majority (Garden 
City: Regnery Gateway, 1982), 283-284. 
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effectively ostracized from power positions within the party, it was, according to 
Schlafly, a reflection on her ideas and not her sex.  
 Schlafly believed firmly that she had never been discriminated against for being 
female and often stated: 
Women who blame sexism for their failure are just looking for an excuse. Some 
of  these women are lazy, others have been brainwashed into thinking there is 
something wrong with ‘just being a housewife,’ so they try to achieve in areas 
they have no aptitude, no qualifications. When they fail, as they are bound to, 
instead of staying home or getting a job suited to their abilities, they make a job 
running around the country wailing about discrimination.35 
 
In Schlafly’s opinion, women were set apart from men in a manner that promotes access 
to certain advantages such as exclusion from the draft and the social expectation that a 
man was responsible for the economic support of his wife. Schlafly’s contention was that 
these differences made women beneficiaries rather than victims. 
 Having narrowly lost her campaign, Schlafly concentrated her efforts on 
American military policy. Here again Schlafly staked out a position for herself that 
operated from the margins more than from the center. As Kathleen Sullivan notes, 
“Imagine having a very attractive, pregnant mom as an authority on the defense situation 
in the early 60s and that was Phyllis Schlafly.”36  While she would publish five books 
dealing with defense issues, her role in the debate was still considered something of a 
sideshow. Even her co-author on some of those books, General Daniel Graham, was 
amazed that a woman would have such a complete and technical understanding of 
defense issues. As Graham would later recall, “the most remarkable thing about Phyllis, 
                                                           
35 Ibid., 298. 
 
36 On the Wings of an Eagle: The Story of Phyllis Schlafly, DVD, directed by Eagle 
Forum (Alton, Illinois: Eagle Form, 1994). 
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when we started working together, was to find a woman who in fact understood national 
security.”37 But for Phyllis Schlafly, military policy was about to take a backseat to 
another cause.  
 The NFRP political defeat also served as the final push Schlafly needed to form 
her own conservative political organization. This group, ostensibly started to collect 
donations for conservative causes and politicians, provided Schlafly with a forum to 
express her views on her terms. Originally called the Eagle Trust Fund, Schlafly’s 
organization would later be rechristened the Eagle Forum during the battle over ERA and 
served as Schlafly's main vehicle of communication with supporters. 
Equal Rights Amendment & Schlafly: 
 
 Originating from the campus social protests of the 1960s, feminism’s second 
wave was a direct challenge to the customs of the time.38 Betty Friedan, whose book The 
Feminine Mystique is cited as being a major galvanizing force in prompting the second 
wave of feminism argued that the American housewife was a victim of a malaise for 
which there was no name. Friedan also stated in the book her desire for “something more 
than my husband and my children and my home” and argued that this was a sentiment 
shared by many housewives in a similar position.39 Also notable at the time were protests 
over Civil Rights and Vietnam in which women were not granted access to positions of 
power. All of these factors, coupled with President Kennedy’s Presidential Commission 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
37 Ibid. 
 
38 Nancy MacLean, The American Women's Movement, 1945-2000: a Brief History 
with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2009), 117. 
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on the Status of Women detailing the inequities existing between the sexes, contributed to 
the formation of a new women’s liberation movement.40 
 The second wave also focused more on specific issues such as employment rights, 
abortion rights, gay rights and educational opportunities for women far more than its 
predecessor had done. As a result, opposition forces developed around singular issues 
within the feminist pro-ERA platform rather than over the ERA itself. For example, 
abortion was a lightening rid for inspiring conservative women to unite against the ERA. 
One organization, the National Right to Life Committee, counted over 11,000 women in 
its membership.41 Schlafly ascertained that bringing those singularly focused 
organizations into the anti-ERA fold would result in a larger membership, many of whom 
would possess valuable community organizing abilities. Social movement researcher 
Nancy MacLean contends Schlafly “concentrated on feminism’s vulnerabilities, among 
them a propensity for inflammatory critiques of conventional families, an emphasis on 
personal freedom that could be construed as individualism heedless of other’s needs, and 
a focus on abuse that appeared to embrace victimhood” as a means of buoying 
membership at the grassroots level. 
By any objective standard, the Equal Rights Amendment appeared destined for 
ratification. To achieve passage, three-fourths of the states, meaning 38 out of 50, needed 
to ratify the ERA by March 1979. Supported by the mainstream, the amendment was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
39 Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2001), 18. 
40 Nancy MacLean, The American Women's Movement, 1945-2000: a Brief History 
with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2009), 66. 
 
41 Ibid., 7, 134. 
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hailed as legislation that would finally solve the legal and social inequities between men 
and women.42  Yet, to Phyllis Schlafly and the STOP ERA movement, it signaled a legal 
precedent to usher in a decidedly liberal social agenda.43 To understand how this issue 
played out politically in terms of coalitions, it is first necessary to develop a context for 
both the amendment and the historical positions of both major political parties.  
 Initially crafted by Alice Paul of The National Women’s Party, the ERA was 
introduced into Congress in 1923 before it was quickly voted down.  And while it was 
introduced in “every Congressional session between 1923 and 1970,” it wasn’t until 1972 
that passage appeared a distinct probability.44  Having the support of key political figures, 
the media and the public, all of the factors were in play for a quick passage. 
 As it would later be used as the basis for contention between pro-ERA and anti-
ERA factions, the wording of this amendment is important to consider. It reads: 
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United  States or by any state on account of sex. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of 
ratification. 
 
Historically, the ERA was a position supported by the Republican establishment. In fact, 
support was so strong that the ERA was a plank included in every national Republican 
                                                           
42 compiled by Renee Feinberg, The Equal Rights Amendment: an Annotated 
Bibliography of the Issues, 1976-1985 (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), 2-3. 
 
43 Phyllis Schlafly, “A Short History of the Era,” The Phyllis Schlafly Report, 
http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/1986/sept86/psrsep86.html (accessed March 10, 2012). 
 
44 Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (Chicago: University Of Chicago 
Press, 1986), 43. 
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convention from 1940 until 1980.45  The amendment also had the support of three 
Republican Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and was 
largely considered a non-divisive issue. At the time, ERA was consistent with the 
traditional positions taken by the Republican Party. For example, in 1940, the Republican 
National Committee adopted a rule mandating that women be equally represented on all 
RNC committees.46  For many, the ERA was simply a natural extension of this move 
toward equal representation within the party.  
 Gaining the support of the Democratic Party establishment for the ERA, however, 
was a somewhat rockier endeavor. Labor unions, led by the American Federation of 
Labor, strongly opposed the amendment fearing the repercussions it could have in the 
workplace. Fearful of losing this voting base, northern Democrat politicians were either 
silent on the issue or publicly criticized it.47 Yet, for southern Democrat politicians not so 
beholden to union organizations, the ERA was far more desirable legislation. In 1944, the 
two sides brokered a truce in which the ERA was added to the party’s national platform. 
Still, no Democrat President publicly came out in support of the ERA until Jimmy Carter. 
This was around the same time that the AFL-CIO dropped its opposition to the 
amendment as well. 
 The two political parties seemingly came together in 1972 when Representative 
Martha Griffiths, a Democrat, secured passage of the amendment in the House of 
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Representatives. After passing the Senate as well, the ERA was officially endorsed by 
Republican President Richard Nixon. One of the strongest and most well organized 
voices calling for the passage of the ERA was the National Organization for Women 
(NOW). This powerful lobbying group, which developed as a successor to John F. 
Kennedy’s Presidential Commission on the Status of Women, had substantial 
Washington contacts they were able to utilize to garner support for the ERA. On the 
Republican side, the ERA was being championed strongly by the President of the 
National Federation of Republican Women, Gladys O’Donnell,  and the co-chair of the 
Republican National Committee, Mary Crisp. Clearly, in 1972, on this issue, those who 
held power in the United States government were largely in agreement. Ratification 
seemed all but certain to be achieved by the March 22, 1979 deadline. 
 With only eight more states needed to pass the ERA, Phyllis Schlafly entered the 
fray. Initially uninterested in the legislation and preferring to direct her attention toward 
military defense strategies, Schlafly grudgingly agreed to take a look at ERA materials 
prepared for an upcoming debate in which she was scheduled to participate. Almost 
immediately she took issue with the amendment. Labeling it anti-family and destructive, 
Schlafly believed the amendment was designed “to eliminate the role of the stay-at-home 
wife by making it socially disdained, economically disadvantaged, and legally shorn of 
traditional protections.”48  
 In February 1972, Phyllis Schlafly publicly declared war on the ERA via an 
article in the Phyllis Schlafly Report entitled “What’s Wrong with ‘Equal Rights’ for 
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Women.”  Directly challenging the assumptions about homemakers made by Betty 
Friedan in The Feminine Mystique, this article laid out Schlafly’s arguments against the 
amendment. Believing that the amendment was “not an honest effort to secure better jobs 
for women who want or need to work outside the home,” Schlafly took particular 
exception to the first two articles.49  
 Article one, Schlafly argued, would eliminate protections and make women 
subject to the draft, eliminate a woman’s automatic right to alimony and child support 
and leave in question the custody of a child in the event of a divorce. In essence, it was an 
attack on the “law and customs” meant to protect the homemaker and the family. Schlafly 
contended: 
I believe in equal pay for equal work. I do not believe in hiring unqualified 
women over qualified men to remedy some oppression of twenty-five years ago. 
The claim that American women are downtrodden and unfairly treated is the fraud 
of the century. The truth is that the American woman has never had it so good. 
Why should we lower ourselves to ‘equal rights’ when we already have the status 
of special privilege?50 
 
Furthermore, Schlafly insisted that the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act accomplished the stated goal of the ERA without opening up potential land mines of 
litigation. By concentrating on what the American woman would lose under ERA, 
Schlafly hoped to appeal to those women in the margins who felt as though their voices 
weren’t being heard.51 
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 Coming into existence for the singular purpose of defeating the ERA, Schlafly’s 
STOP ERA was a classic countermovement. With both sides competing for legislative 
power, pro-ERA advocates already had their network in place. Schlafly recognized 
immediately that she would need both a publicity machine to get her message out as well 
as rhetoric that would appeal to women at the grassroots. Because the Eagle Forum, 
Schlafly’s conservative watchdog group started during the debacle with the NFRW, was 
a functioning political interest group, many of the administrative needs of Schlafly’s 
campaign were already in place. The Phyllis Schlafly Report served as the main vehicle 
for Schlafly to espouse her views and was capable of being disseminated outside of 
traditional media channels. For instance, copies of the report circulated in churches across 
the country and were picked up by local television and radio stations. Similarly, the Eagle 
Forum provided a structure like-minded organizations could emulate.  
 The next step in shoring up support for the cause was to create a network wherein 
local groups would be empowered while simultaneously reinforcing Schlafly’s position 
as the movement’s leader.  Schlafly first turned to the women who had supported her 
during her failed bid for the National Federation of Republican Women. This list, 
including Ann Patterson from Oklahoma, Irma Donnelson from Ohio, and Kate Hoffman 
from Illinois, represented women who had pull at the local level but were not major 
political players.52 Next, Schlafly sought out the support of religious and conservative 
organizations whose ideology matched her own. Ultimately, evangelical churches such as 
the Church of Christ, Southern Baptists, Mormons, Orthodox Jews and Roman Catholics 
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joined the movement. This was the first time that female members of evangelical 
churches across the spectrum worked publicly and in greater numbers than their male 
counterparts.53  Schlafly hoped to draw upon the existing membership of these 
organizations in order to have a reserve of manpower. By early 1973, “STOP ERA 
organizations existed in twenty-six states and were especially strong in states critical to 
the ratification of the ERA.”54 
 As special interest coalitions, each side had distinct advantages and 
disadvantages. For the pro-ERA advocates, support at the national level via the Carter 
Administration meant access to funding and traditional channels of media. Yet, an 
onslaught of emerging divisions within the pro-ERA forces meant that there was no one 
person in charge who symbolized the movement. As Political Scientist Jeffrey M. Berry 
notes, sometimes “the quality of leadership may be more important than the quality of 
cause or the strength of the disturbance.”55  Pro-ERA supporters inadvertently provided 
the STOP ERA movement with a powerful figurehead in Schlafly. By directing insults in 
the media against Schlafly specifically, pro-ERA advocates imbued her with authority 
Schlafly was then able to manipulate to her advantage. Additionally, the pro-ERA 
coalition was becoming splintered over disagreement as to the inclusion of abortion and 
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lesbian rights in their platform as well as division on how best to achieve their political 
goals.56  
 In contrast, STOP ERA was highly organized and had a charismatic leader at its 
helm. Additionally, while all members were socially conservative, STOP ERA had at the 
grassroots level what Christopher Bosso refers to as a “denser and more internally 
diverse” populace.57  Yet, despite this cohesion, STOP ERA did not initially have the 
support of the establishment. In fact, Republicans were initially divided as to how best 
proceed on the issue. But the biggest obstacle for STOP ERA out of the gate was the 
disparity in access to the media. 
 Not having access to the same venues as pro-ERA advocates, specifically the 
national media, Schlafly attempted to prevent further ratification by going after the 
amendment at the state level. It was at this point, that Schlafly’s public voice began to 
gain momentum. And ultimately, it was this voice that the pro-ERA contingent, led 
primarily by feminists, attempted to silence in Houston. 
 John Burger writes, “Most social movements appropriate and recodify the 
languages of the existing dominant social order they wish to change.”58  How pro-ERA 
supporters framed and responded to Schlafly illustrate the intentional side of ritual 
adoption, or the tendency by a minority to use the majority’s rhetoric in making its case. 
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Michael Rogin explains what he calls the American “countersubversive tradition” as 
demonization used as a tool of elites to suppress political dissent: “the creation of 
monsters as a continuing feature of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and 
dehumanization of political foes.”59 One example of the dehumanization tactics levied 
against Schlafly concern the charges that she was a Nazi and a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan. And while there was never any evidentiary link between Schlafly and the two 
organizations, it didn’t stop pro-ERA advocates from making the link. Feminist Jo Ann 
Horowitz labeled Schlafly a “friend to the KKK” in a debate the two women were having 
on a college campus and the narrative took off.60 For instance, on the cover of the 
national magazine Advocate, Schlafly’s photo was superimposed next to Larry Hicks, 
president of the Ku Klux Klan signifying the assertion that the two were in cahoots. 
Similarly, cartoonist Garry Trudea, a known pro-ERA advocate, featured Schlafly in his 
wildly popular Doonesbury comic with the tagline: Hey Phyllis, your sheet is showing.   
 While the intentional manipulation of the dominant paradigm by a minority can 
influence culture favorably for a minority, the unintentional side effect of ritual adoption 
carries with it harms destructive to the minority. Darsey writes, “Social movement theory 
implies that groups struggling against oppression tend to assume the character of the 
oppressor.” As we’ve examined, the dominant culture has two patterns of discrimination: 
silencing and demonization. Pro-ERA advocates in their struggle against Schlafly 
adopted these patterns of discrimination. 
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HOUSTON, 1977 
 
 Having been effective in slowing down ratification, Schlafly’s leadership was 
becoming known to the key players involved in trying to pass the ERA. Initially, she was 
dismissed by her opponents as little more than a rabble-rouser with no long-term staying 
power. Many within the pro-ERA movement were so convinced that women would 
unilaterally support the amendment that no plans as to how to address potential 
opposition were ever formulated.61 Having been caught off-guard by Schlafly’s well-run 
network, pro-ERA advocates quickly sought to discredit her. By examining the silencing 
tactics employed against Schlafly in Houston as well as how Schlafly’s response rhetoric 
meets the criteria of new conservative feminism, Schlafly’s speech in Houston is 
transformed into a major moment in American feminism. 
 In order to silence, one must be working from a position of power. For pro-ERA 
advocates, their access to the vast majority of traditional media meant that they not only 
carried the perception of power, via Presidential support, but that they also had access to 
the tools of power, specifically television.62 In many respects, the initial coverage of the 
ERA by the media was simply a reflection of the general views held by society. The 
move toward ratification was initially swift. By the end of 1973, thirty states ratified the 
ERA with little fanfare. Additionally, “more than 450 organizations with memberships 
well over fifty million” endorsed the ERA helping to fuel the perception that it was a 
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mainstream issue.”63 Gallop Polls and the Harris Survey also consistently indicated 
support for the ERA outpaced criticism by two to one.64  From 1972-1974, efforts to pass 
the amendment were largely described in positive terms by nightly news coverage on all 
three major networks.65  The same is true for how the ERA was covered on television talk 
shows and in women’s magazines during this period.66 Most accounts emphasized themes 
of equality and civil rights without directly linking the cause to a specific strain of 
feminism. Opposition to the amendment was not prevalent in mainstream media outlets 
and most agencies covered the story by speculating about possible outcomes to the 
legislation rather than questioning its passage.67  
 This tacit support of the amendment by the mainstream media added to the air of 
invincibility felt by pro-ERA advocates. Not surprisingly, it was from this vantage point 
which pro-ERA feminists accepted Schlafly’s offer to debate the legislation. On college 
campuses across the United States, Schlafly turned up to debate the merits of ERA. Her 
formidable opponents, a virtual who’s who of the feminist movement in the late 1970s, 
often became frustrated by these exchanges.68 Not only was Schlafly publicly unflappable 
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but also the heated exchanges caught the eye of reporters looking for stories. Not only did 
the decision to debate Schlafly ultimately showcase the schism in political thought among 
pro-ERA supporters but it also gave Schlafly entry into the national dialogue taking place 
on television.  
 By 1975, Schlafly was expanding her audience through appearances on national 
programs such as Donahue and the Mike Douglas Show and through her position as 
commentator on the CBS owned radio program, Spectrum. This media exposure provided 
her with an air of legitimacy on the national level she hadn’t had prior. Her appearances, 
carefully calculated, were meant to showcase her rhetoric as that of the Christian majority 
and that of her opposition as the immoral minority.  While she was in the process of 
rewriting the public narrative on the amendment, Schlafly was still operating from the 
margins in both political access and public perception. To the leadership of the pro-ERA 
movement, however, Schlafly’s sudden visibility was an issue that needed to be 
addressed quickly. 
 Ridicule, as defined by Dendrinos and Pedro (1997), is an effective way of 
silencing an opponent because it can be used against the rhetoric of a speaker as well as 
the traits exhibited by the speaker. For example, while Schlafly’s views were ridiculed so 
to was her appearance and affect. By mocking Schlafly’s views as well as her personally, 
pro-ERA supporters hoped to undermine her arguments. One such instance occurred on a 
Firing Line episode in which Professor Brenda Eddy from Georgetown and Dr. Ann 
Scott, from the National Organization of Women, attempted to portray Schlafly as out of 
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touch and labeled her position as “nonsense.”69 Similarly, Bella Abzug attempted to 
thwart Schlafly's appearance on Donahue by referring to her as “that silly woman.” But 
for pro-ERA advocates, these exchanges were not having the desired effect. Instead of 
silencing Schlafly, these tactics seemingly bolstered her position. Set against Schlafly’s 
smiling and personable demeanor, the feminists who debated Schlafly came across as 
aggressive and radical.  
 As the battle of the ERA waged, feminist leaders became increasingly frustrated 
by their inability to stop Schlafly. So they attempted to silence her with increasingly 
violent rhetoric instead. No longer the dismissive ridicule first employed, the rhetoric 
used became decidedly biting and, in some cases, violent. On various occasions, leaders 
in the pro-ERA movement declared Schlafly should be “hit,” “smacked,” “punched,” and 
“burned at the stake”70 These comments were made by Florence Kennedy, Joanie 
Caucus, Harlan Ellison, and Betty Freidan, respectively. Such proclamations were at odds 
with the anti-violence stance many of these same individuals espoused. On April 16, 
1977 this rhetoric of violence came full circle when activist Aron Kay hit Schlafly in the 
face with a pie. The incident, mocked by the press and feminist leadership, left Schlafly 
with evident facial bruising.  Realizing that efforts at ridicule were having the opposite 
effect of their intended purpose, a new approach to silencing Schlafly was adopted. The 
pro-ERA forces would simply censor her. 
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 First appointed by President Ford in 1975, the U.S. Commission on the 
International Women’s Year was charged with holding state conferences to assess the 
needs of American women.71 It would culminate in a national conference comprised of 
delegates selected at each state conference. From the start, public funding of the 
conference was an issue for Schlafly and the STOP ERA movement. When having her 
supporters write their congressmen urging them to vote against the funding didn’t work, 
Schlafly tackled the issue at the state level. By the time the federal funding for the state 
conferences became available, both sides were engaged in a heated battle. 
 While state commissions were balanced in terms of age, race and income, they 
were not balanced when it came to stances taken on the ERA. Schlafly contended that as 
these were commissions receiving federal funding, equal representation of viewpoint was 
required. Fights broke out between the two sides and states with a strong evangelical base 
such as Missouri, Ohio, Hawaii, Washington, Montana, and Idaho were able to secure 
positions on the commissions.72 In the final tally, the anti-ERA movement was able to 
secure twenty percent of the delegate slots for its members.73  
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 With the federally sponsored five million dollar conference about to convene, 
Phyllis Schlafly was informed that she would not be allowed to speak.74 Ostensibly the 
reason given was that she had not followed proper protocol; a charge Schlafly denied 
vehemently. In the end, no person advocating against the ERA was invited to speak at the 
conference. The decision to censor Schlafly on this national stage was an attempt by pro-
ERA advocates to control the message coming out of Houston.75  
 This approach to silence, explained by Dendrinos and Pedro (1997), is an attempt 
at consensus building through the perception that there is no legitimate voice in 
opposition. By preventing Schlafly from speaking, organizers attempted to marginalize 
her viewpoint and silence her rhetoric. They also illustrated their position of power by 
having the resources necessary to exclude Schlafly. Conference organizers, who were 
almost unilaterally feminists, believed that by silencing Schlafly in Houston they would 
be able to present a unified proposal for equity to the American public that would be seen 
as being supported by the majority.76 And yet, the exact opposite happened. 
 Miscalculating Schlafly’s response to her exclusion from the National Women’s 
Conference, many pro-ERA supporters were shocked at what was about to unfold. 
Instead of returning home to prepare for more state ratification battles, Schlafly used the 
opportunity to espouse her rhetoric on her own terms. Calling upon Lottie Beth Hobbs, 
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President of the Pro-Family Forum, Schlafly set about to create a rival convention to take 
place simultaneously in Houston.77  Holding the event in the Houston Astrodome, the 
20,000 seat capacity venue was filled to capacity with supporters. Schlafly emphasized to 
the media that not only was her conference filled, but attendees had paid their own way to 
attend unlike the federally supported delegates at the International Women’s Conference.  
Schlafly also used her exclusion from the official convention as a way of highlighting her 
marginalized status to the media. She was able to use her situation to highlight that the 
conference didn’t speak for all women as it claimed but just those who agreed with its 
dogma. By showcasing the rising tensions in Houston, Schlafly was able to increase 
media interest in the event which she then parlayed into greater visibility for her speech. 
In fact, media coverage of both the official conference and the Pro-Family rally 
spearheaded by Schlafly and Hobbs intensified dramatically, most likely owing to the 
drama unfolding almost on a daily basis. 
 Knowing that the eyes of the national media were on her, Phyllis Schlafly took 
the stage in Houston on November 18, 1977. She wasted no time in clarifying what she 
saw as the underlining reason for the division between the two groups: 
There are many differences between this meeting and the one next door. We 
started out by offering a prayer and I think you should know that at that other 
meeting, they didn’t have a prayer. They just started out with a moment of silence 
for fear that they would offend many of their members that were present. I’m very 
proud that they excluded me from that convention and I’m here where we’re not 
ashamed and not afraid to ask God’s  blessing on this crowd assembled here 
today. 
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With these words, Schlafly reframed in simple terms the debate over the ERA. It was no 
longer just about securing equal protections under the law for women, as the pro-ERA 
advocates maintained, but now it was a moral battle for the future of America with God 
placed squarely in the middle. 
 Schlafly also used her turn at the podium to drive home what she deemed the 
illegitimacy of the National Women’s Conference. Calling into question both its 
legitimacy and its truthfulness about its objectives, Schlafly didn’t mince words over her 
perception that the National Women’s Conference and ERA were frauds being 
perpetrated against the American public: 
The whole thing was designed as a media event; a charade to go through the 
motions of these phony state conferences and national conferences in order to 
pass resolutions that were pre-written and pre-packaged a year and a half ago and 
published in June 1976 and then after it was all over to then tell the Congress and 
state legislatures that this is what American women want. By coming here today, 
you have shown that this is not what  American women want. 
 
 An act of rebellion, this speech enabled Schlafly to publicly reclaim the voice taken from 
her by the dominant culture as well as to reframe her role in the struggle. Instead of 
allowing the feminist portrayal of her as an ineffectual malcontent to be the story, 
Schlafly rebranded herself in Houston to be a God warrior fighting against the privilege 
of a radical left. Working from the margins, she utilized the silencing techniques directed 
against her to her advantage. 
 Almost overnight, who occupied the dominant and the marginalized spheres of 
the public debate became unclear. One reason for the confusion was the public splintering 
of the pro-ERA in Houston. “As virtually every feminist identity or goal had an 
organization,” uniformity of position on issues ranging from abortion rights to gay rights 
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was not evident.78 Additionally, the actual conference was perceived as being 
unorganized and taken over by special interests. In trying to include all positions by all 
women, organizers left themselves vulnerable to public dissent among the ranks. 
Exacerbating this issue was an attempt by the anti-ERA delegates to have an anti-ERA 
plank added to the conference from the floor of the convention. When the pro-ERA 
chairwoman denied them, the contingent erupted into chants of “voter scam.” 
 In stark contrast, Schlafly’s STOP ERA campaign was remarkably cohesive. One 
of the unintentional side effects of the efforts to silence Schlafly was that it provided to 
her the opportunity to broaden her agenda for long-term political viability. Prior to the 
federally funded state conferences, STOP ERA was comprised mainly of southern groups 
with the sole focus of opposing the ERA. In Houston, Schlafly moved seamlessly away 
from her original specific agenda to “a well-coordinated pro-family movement with a 
much broader agenda.”79  
 Schlafly’s rhetoric in Houston was unabashedly that of a new conservative 
feminist. By elevating the role of the homemaker in her speech and making her 
marginalization about her stance on the ERA and not her sex, Schlafly reclaimed 
feminism from the radical left and its assumption of male dominance. Additionally, her 
refusal to acquiesce to those in power, whether male or female, citing a moral imperative 
as a mother and wife indicates that she did not link these roles to subservience but instead 
sees them as a potential bases of power. 
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 In the aftermath of Houston, support for the ERA was declining. Not only had a 
mere one state ratified it since STOP ERA become involved, but three states had 
attempted to rescind their earlier ratifications. Signs that passage was no longer assured 
became more common than not. This was brought to a head when the Carter 
Administration was able to successfully extend the ratification timeline by three years in 
order to give pro-ERA forces more time to accomplish their mission. Infuriating anti-
ERA advocates, this move signaled a change in perception on the issue for both the 
establishment and the mainstream.   
 Still, the biggest change as a result of Houston concerned a shift taking place 
within the Republican Party establishment. Once united on the issue of the ERA, there 
was now a fight for the political direction of the party. As Michael Lind (1995) explains, 
“members of the moderate middle tended to be old-fashioned Eisenhower and 
Rockefeller Republicans who felt alienated by the supply-siders and religious right 
activists whom since the 1970’s have taken over the G.O.P.”80  With Schlafly’s network 
in place at the state level, a natural extension of their work on the ERA was to support 
candidates who agreed with their position. As the internal makeup of the Republican 
Party started to change based upon what was happening at the grassroots level, so too did 
its position on the ERA. In 1980, it was officially dropped from the party platform 
signaling a new era in Republican politics. 
 By June 1982, time was running out to pass the amendment. Increasingly 
desperate, pro-ERA advocates turned to the media. While some engaged in theatrics, 
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such as hunger strikes and chaining themselves to the doors of the Senate, others, such as 
Betty Friedan, began to publicly disavow their previous scorn of the homemaker. As 
images of pro-ERA factions in the media became more radicalized, Schlafly was training 
women in her organization how to dress and behave in interviews so as to not appear 
threatening to the viewing audience.81 By visually appearing more mainstream, STOP 
ERA repositioned itself in the media and, by extension, in the minds of many Americans. 
In the end, despite an unprecedented three-year extension, Schlafly and the pro-family 
movement defeated the ERA. For Phyllis Schlafly, victory against the ERA as well as her 
early support of Ronald Reagan’s political agenda made her a new center of the 
Republican Party-- a party that had once scorned her. 
Conclusions: 
    
The association of modern feminism to a decidedly liberal social platform 
excludes unfairly women who classify themselves as conservatives. As Schlafly 
illustrates, new conservative feminism solves for this exclusion by situating motherhood 
in a position of power. This strain of feminism doesn’t attack traditional culture as much 
as it celebrates it. As such, women are not inherently discriminated against because their 
power is a biological imperative. Rather, if they do face discrimination, it is for their 
ideas. And, as Schlafly demonstrates, that discrimination need not be construed as 
negative. Instead, it can be utilized for political and social gain. 
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 The relevancy of the marginalization of Schlafly can be seen in its lasting 
implications. First, Schlafly was able to use the marginalization process as a way to bring 
attention to her ideas. Although she didn’t believe that she faced discrimination because 
of her sex, she did feel that there were times when she was ostracized for her political and 
social beliefs. By positioning her message against the immoral confines of a dominant 
culture controlled by her adversaries, Schlafly used effectively the momentum that comes 
with being perceived as the underdog. Second, her role as spokesperson for the “silent 
majority” gave this group its first visible spokesperson and helped to spawn debate over 
family values. She used the platform to demarginalize the very women the media had 
insisted via their roles as homemakers and offered a new perspective on what the 
different roles for the sexes entailed. 
 From a political science standpoint, the case study of Phyllis Schlafly in Houston 
offers a number of conclusions worthy of further inquiry. Certainly the history of the 
Equal Rights Amendment is a contentious one but it signals the impact special interest 
groups can have upon political ideology and the perceptions of power.  The realignment 
of the Republican Party in the wake of the defeat of the ERA exemplifies the importance 
of coalition building and how quickly who occupies the center and who occupies the 
margins can change. As evangelical conservatives under Ronald Reagan replaced 
moderate conservatives, the Republican Party moved closer to the ideology expressed by 
Schlafly. 
 The success of Phyllis Schlafly’s agenda is due to her skillful adaption to 
discrimination and demonology imposed by the dominant political culture. Her refusal to 
acquiesce to those in authority is a recurring theme in her political career. Never one to 
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claim victimization, Schlafly is the embodiment of a woman who found lasting public 
success both in the political arena as well as the domestic arena. By rejecting the inherent 
victimization of modern feminism and showcasing how the tools of the oppressor can be 
used to negotiate power, Phyllis Schlafly spearheaded one of the most successful 
grassroots campaigns in American History and, in the process, accidentally created a new 
breed of feminist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
Works Cited 
 
Berkowitz, Peter. Varieties of Conservatism in America. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover 
Institution Press, 2004. 
 
Berry, Jeffrey M. “The Origins and Maintenance of Public Interest Organizations.” In 
Lobbying For the People, page 26. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977 
 
Boles, Janet K. “Building Support For the Era: A Case of Too Much, Too Late.” PS 
Autumn (1982): page 572-577. 
 
Bosso, Christopher. “Filling Advocacy Niches.” In Environment, Inc.: From Grassroots 
to Beltway, page 52. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005. 
 
Bradley, Patricia. Mass Media and the Shaping of American Feminism, 1963-1975. 
Jackson, MS.: University Press of Mississippi, 2004. 
 
Brown, Ruth Murray. For a. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2002.  
 
Buckley, William F. Jr. Firing Line. DVD. Directed by Hoover Institution Video Library. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2008. 
 
Burger, John R. One Handed Histories: The Eroto-Politics of Gay Male  
 Video Pornography. New York: Hayworth Press, 1995. 
 
Butler, Mathilda, and William Paisley. “Equal Rights Coverage in  
 Magazines.” Journalism Quarterly 55, no. 1 (1978): 157-60. 
 
Chafe, William H., Harvard Sitkoff, and Beth Bailey, eds. A History of Our Time: 
Readings On Post War America. 7th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2008. 
 
Cottrell, Debbie Mauldin. “National Women's Conference, 1977.” Handbook of Texas 
Online. http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/pwngq (accessed 
March 25, 2012). 
 
Critchlow, Donald T. Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: a Woman's 
Crusade. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2005. 
 
Cudd, Ann. Analyzing Oppression. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Devigne, Robert. Recasting Conservatism: Oakeshott, Strauss, and the Response to 
Postmodernism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. 
 40 
 
Felsenthal, Carol. Phyllis Schlafly; the Sweetheart of the Silent Majority. Garden City: 
Regnery Gateway, 1982. 
 
Feinberg, compiled by Renee. The Equal Rights Amendment: an Annotated Bibliography 
of the Issues, 1976-1985. London: Greenwood Press, 1986. 
 
Fitzgerald, Sara. Elly Peterson:. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press/Regional, 
2011. 
 
Fivush, Robyn. “The Feminist Model of Autobiography.” In The Mediated Mind: Essays 
in Honor of Katherine Nelson, page nr. Mahwah: Erlbaum, 2002. 
 
Freeman, Jo. “Whatever Happened to Republican Feminists.” Jo Freeman. 
http://www.jofreeman.com/polhistory/repubfem.htm (accessed March 11, 2012). 
 
Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. New York: W. W. Norton &  
 Company, 2001. 
 
Frum, David. How We Got Here: The 70's: The Decade That Brought You Modern Life--
For Better or Worse. New York: Basic Books, 2000. 
 
Greenfield, Meg. “The Goldwater Precedent.” Newsweek, August 1994. 
 
Houston, Marsha, and Cheris Kramarae. “Speaking from Silence: Methods of Silencing 
and Resistance.” Discourse Society 2 (1991): 388-399.  
 
Jaworski, Adam, ed. Silence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York: Mouton De 
Gruyter, 1997. 
 
Lind, Michael. “The Radical Center or the Moderate Middle.” New York Times 
Magazine, December 3, 1995. 
 
MacKinnon, Catherine A. Feminism Unmodified: Discourses On Life and Law. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988. 
 
MacLean, Nancy. The American Women's Movement, 1945-2000: a Brief History with 
Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2009. 
 
Mansbridge, Jane J. Why We Lost the ERA. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1986. 
 
Mathews, Donald G., and Jane S. De Hart. Sex, Gender, and the Politics of ERA: A State 
and the Nation. New York, Oxford.: Oxford University Press, USA, 1992. 
 
National NOW Times. Now National Era Campaign Launched. Feb. 11, 1979. 
 41 
 
On the Wings of an Eagle: The Story of Phyllis Schlafly. DVD. Directed by Eagle Forum. 
Alton, Illinois: Eagle Form, 1994. 
 
Raimundo, Justin. Colin Powell and the Power Elite. New York: America First Books, 
1996. 
 
Rossi, Alice S. Feminists in Politics: a Panel Analysis of the First National Women's 
Conference. New York: Academic Pr, 1982. 
 
Ryan, Bryan, and editor. Major 20th-Century Writers: a Selection of Sketches from 
Contemporary Authors. 2nd ed. 4 vols. Detroit, Mich.: Gale Group, 1999. 
 
Rymph, Catherine E. Republican Women: Feminism and Conservatism from Suffrage 
through the Rise of the New Right. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006. 
 
Schlafly, Phyllis. “A Short History of the Era.” The Phyllis Schlafly Report. 
http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/1986/sept86/psrsep86.html (accessed March 10, 
2012). 
 
Sory, Ronald, and Bruce Laurie. The Rise of Conservatism in America, 1945-2000: a 
Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008. 
 
Stacey, Judith. “New Conservative Feminism.” Feminist Studies 9, no. 3 (1983): 559-83. 
 
Thomson, Rosemary. Price of Liberty. Carol Stream: Strang Communications Co, 1978. 
 
Toplin, Robert Brent. Radical Conservatism: the Right's Political Religion. Lawrence, 
Kan.: Univ Pr of Kansas, 2006. 
 
Young, Iris Marion. “Five Faces of Oppression.” In Rethinking Power, page nr. Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1992. 
 
Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Paperback reissue / ed. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42 
      VITA 
Elizabeth L. Erwin is a transplanted South Carolinian who holds masters degrees 
in both Library & Information Sciences and American Studies. Her grandfather inspired 
her love for history and she is currently pursuing her doctorate in that field at Lehigh 
University. Having been a Youth Services librarian, Elizabeth is interested in using 
digital media to make history more accessible to children and teens. She is currently at 
work on her first full-length documentary project on the history of the National 
Federation of Republican Women.  
 
 
 
 
 
